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JN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OFUTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
:

Case No. 990374-CA

:
Priority No. 2

ENRIQUE CORIA,
Defendant/ Appellant.

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from his sentencing for conviction of solicitation to commit
murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203 (1999).
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court act within its discretion in ordering defendant's
sentence for solicitation to commit murder to run consecutively to his sentence for a
previous murder?
Standard of Review: A sentence will not be disturbed unless it exceeds that
permitted by law or the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d
1
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987, 988 (Utah 1986). An appellate court finds an abuse of discretion only if "'no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v.
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1978)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998) provides as follows:
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall
run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run
consecutively.
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run
consecutively if the later offense is committed while the defendant is
imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds and states on the record
that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
* # #

(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
# * #

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 20, 1998, defendant was charged with solicitation to commit
aggravated murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203
(1999) (R.l). On December 17, 1999, defendant entered a guilty plea to a reduced
charge of solicitation to commit murder, a second degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-4-203 (1999) (R.63-66). On March 25, 1999, the court sentenced
defendant to a term of 1-15 years for the second degree solicitation and ordered the

2
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sentence to run consecutively to the murder sentence he was then serving (R.12).
Defendant timely appealed (R.77).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
While incarcerated pending trial on a homicide charge, defendant solicited
another inmate to murder a key witness in defendant's murder case for $1,000.
Defendant was arrested on a criminal homicide charge on January 23, 1998, and
held in the Weber County Jail through late February awaiting trial (R.92: 3). While
incarcerated, defendant met John Garrard, who was housed in the same cell block for
several days (R.92:8). Although Garrard and defendant had not previously met,
defendant would stop by Garrard's cell to talk when defendant was let out of his cell
and allowed to walk around the cell block for one or two hours each day (R.92:8-9).
Defendant told Garrard that he was in jail on a murder charge, and
discussed the facts of the murder with him (R.92:9). Defendant told Garrard that he
and a friend, James Claude Carroll, had been in defendant's truck looking for rival
gang members who owed defendant money from a drug deal (R.92:19,27, 29).
Defendant described how he and Carroll had caught up to the rival gang at an Ogden
gas station, but had been outnumbered and chased away (R.92:27). A car full of the
rival gang members had then followed defendant and Carroll out of the gas station. As
the rival car passed defendant's truck, defendant fired a handgun into the vehicle

3
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(R.92:9,29). Defendant told Garrard that one of the bullets fired by Carroll or him had
hit someone in the other car in the back of the head (R.92:10,29).
After describing the murder, defendant told Garrard he was worried that Carroll
would testify against him and implicate him in the murder (R.92:10). Defendant asked
Garrard how much it would cost to have Carroll killed (R.92:10, 24). Garrard told
defendant to name a price, and defendant offered Garrard $1000 to kill Carroll
(R.92:10-11). Defendant later told Garrard that he could not come up with $1,000, and
asked if "a car and a couple of hundred would be good enough" (R.92:24). Defendant
and Garrard discussed the arrangement several times a day for the next few days
(R.92:12). The two arranged for Garrard to contact defendant when Garrard got out
on bail (R.92:11). Defendant gave Garrard his phone number, name and gang name,
and offered to provide Garrard with a pistol that he had hidden on his property in order
to complete the murder (R.92:11-13).
Garrard felt defendant was very serious about the murder, and that it would have
happened with or without his involvement. Garrard believed defendant was an angry
and dangerous man (R.92:13-14, 31).
Garrard reported defendant's murder solicitation to the police (R.92:14-16).
Detectives Chad Ledford and Steve Zachardy of the Ogden Police Department arranged
for Garrard to call defendant while they listened in on the conversation (R.92:15-18).

4
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When Garrard asked defendant about the proposed murder of Carroll, defendant stated
that "it had already been taken care of" (R.92:18).
Defendant was arrested for solicitation (R.92:38-39). Although defendant had
earlier denied he had talked to anyone about killing Carroll, when confronted with the
tape, he asserted that Garrard had approached him about the murder (R.92:41, 48).
Based upon his belief that there was a substantial risk of conviction, defendant
pleaded guilty to a solicitation of murder charge without admitting the elements of the
crime, as allowed under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (R.91:6-7).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that defendant's crimes were
both "serious" and "involved violence" (R.93:ll) (Addendum A). The trial court also
found that defendant was still "in denial of this [crime] notwithstanding his plea of
guilty" (R.93:12). The court felt this raised "a question in the Court's mind about how
conducive [defendant] would be to supervision in a less restrictive setting" (R.93:ll).
The court found mitigating circumstances not mentioned in the presentence report,
including that defendant is "developmentally slow" and does not see "accurately some
of the consequences of his acts"(R.93:12).
The trial court considered the factors listed in section 76-3-401(4) in deciding
whether a consecutive sentence should be imposed, including the gravity and
circumstances of the crime (a "very serious charge") and defendant's rehabilitative
needs, and ordered that defendant's sentence on the murder solicitation charge run
5
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consecutively with his murder sentence (R.93:12). The court found that given the
nature of the offense, the consecutive sentence was not "oppressive or unreasonable"
(R.93:12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that defendant's sentence
for solicitation of murder run consecutively to his prior murder sentence. Consecutive
sentencing is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, and the court properly
considered the factors listed in section 76-3-401 as relevant to the determination

t;

whether to impose a consecutive sentence. Defendant's presentence report has not been
made a part of the record on appeal, and the trial court's balancing of the various
factors relevant to sentencing therefore cannot be reviewed by this Court on appeal.
In addition, the nature of the crime, solicitation to murder a potential witness in
defendant's murder case, makes consecutive sentencing especially appropriate, in that a
consecutive sentence is necessary to provide a deterrent. Defendant's refusal
to acknowledge his guilt also supports the court's finding that consecutive sentencing is
appropriate.
Finally, the case law also supports the court's exercise of discretion in imposing
a consecutive sentence, in that such sentences have only been reversed upon a showing
that the consecutive sentences operated to remove any significant discretion from the
Board of Pardons in monitoring a defendant's progress in prison. The sentence
6
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imposed in this case does not add significantly to the minimum sentence that defendant
will serve.
ARGUMENT
POINTI
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO
SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE AND THE
HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF
THE DEFENDANT
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly imposed a consecutive sentence
due to its failure to consider his potential to be rehabilitated and to take into account the
significance of his Alford-type guilty plea, in which he refused to acknowledge his
guilt. Brief of Appellant, pp.8-12.
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's sentencing decisions for
abuse of discretion. State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting
State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)). "Abuse of discretion 'may be
manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the
judge imposed a "clearly excessive sentence."'" Houk, 906 P.2d at 909 (quoting State
v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App. 1995)). Additionally, "abuse of discretion
results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors' or if the sentence
imposed is 'clearly excessive.'" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990)
(footnotes and citations omitted). This Court "may only find abuse of discretion 'if it
7
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can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court."'
Houk, 906 P.2d at 909 {quoting Wright, 893 P.2d at 1120).
Consecutive sentencing statute. When a defendant has been found guilty of
multiple felonies, Utah law grants the trial court discretion to impose consecutive
sentences. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1) (1999) provides that "[a] court shall
determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense,
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses." The statute
directs the trial court to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to
impose consecutive sentences." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) (1999). However, the
statute requires only that the court consider these factors, not that it give them equal
weight. See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("Although a sentencing
judge will give considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also
consider other factors."); State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant
rather than rehabilitating him"). As such, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing
necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court," seeking to impose "a proper
sentence based on the facts and law before it." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utahl978).

8
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At defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court properly considered the
statutory factors, and found that the "gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" supported the imposition
of consecutive sentences. The court's consideration and balancing of these factors was
thorough and careful, and its ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
The gravity and circumstances of the offenses. At the sentencing hearing, the
trial court discussed the nature of defendant's crimes and found them to be grave and
serious (R.93:12) (Addendum A). The first offense was a gang-related drive-by
shooting and murder in which defendant opened fire on the passing vehicle of a rival
gang member (R.92:9,27,29). The second offense was a solicitation to kill a witness to
defendant's murder offense, with defendant asking a fellow inmate to kill the passenger
in his truck during the murder because he was afraid the witness would testify against
him(R.92:10).
These separate crimes are both serious and warrant consecutive sentences.
Noting that both crimes were violent, the trial court found that defendant's solicitation
of a murder was especially serious under the circumstances: "the solicitation to kill a
person who may be a witness in a homicide seems to the Court to be a very serious
charge and it's one to which he pled guilty" (R.93:12).
Indeed, the specific facts of this crime make consecutive sentences especially
appropriate. While in custody for murder charges, defendant solicited the murder of a
9
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witness in his pending case. Imposition of consecutive sentences is the only way to
deter such conduct because if, as in this case, a defendant anticipating a murder
conviction were to only face a concurrent sentence for killing a witness in his case,
there would not be any disincentive to making the attempt. See Utah Code Ann. § 763-401(2) (1999) (creating a presumption in favor of consecutive sentences where a later
offense is committed while defendant is imprisoned or on parole).1
Instead of considering the serious nature of his crime, defendant simply criticizes
the state's evidence, reciting a limited and skewed version of the facts.2 However, the
nature of the state's evidence is not an issue at sentencing. Imposition of any sentence
is based upon a finding that defendant is, in fact, guilty, and defendant's criticism of
the state's evidence does not undercut the court's finding regarding the seriousness of
the crime.

1

At sentencing, the prosecutor argued that the court should "send a message to
other inmates who are sitting in the Weber County Jail that this county will not tolerate
somebody making arrangements to kill a witness in a case." Defendant asserts that the
court abused its discretion "by even considering" this argument (Brief of Appellant, p.
12), but fails to explain why the prosecutor's statement is improper: deterrence of
others is a proper sentencing consideration, and consecutive sentences are appropriate,
even necessary to provide a deterrent under these circumstances. State v. Gardner, 947
P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1997) (traditional justifications for punishment include retribution,
incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation).
2

Defendant likewise argued his innocence to the trial court, prompting the
prosecutor to describe at length the strong evidence of guilt which formed the basis for
defendant's guilty plea (R.93:5-9). The trial court responded by simply noting that
defendant had, in fact, pled guilty to the charge (R.93:12).
10
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Jv

Defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs. In sentencing
defendant to consecutive terms, the court considered all of the information contained in
defendant's presentence report, the accuracy of which is not challenged, and which has
not been made a part of the record on appeal. In the absence of the report, the
appellate court must assume that the information contained in the report would support
the court's ruling. State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988) ("defendant has not
provided this Court with a copy of the presentence report, so there is nothing before
this Court to determine whether the trial court's use of that report amounted to an abuse
of discretion. Absent a record, this Court presumes regularity in the proceedings
below."); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 n. 12 (Utah App. 1993) (appellate review
of sentencing decision is limited when presentence report is not made a part of the
record on appeal).
Thus, defendant's assertion that the trial court "failed to consider his potential to
be rehabilitated" (Brief of Appellant, p. 9) is unsupported by the record, and wrong.
The record indicates that the court considered the information contained in defendant's
presentence report, which defendant does not question on appeal. The court also
considered the fact that a psychological evaluation had determined that defendant is
"somewhat developmentally slow" (R.93:12).

11
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Given the facts of the case, the court properly found that defendant did not have
a strong potential for rehabilitation, especially in light of defendant's refusal to
acknowledge his guilt:
The Court will make the following findings that this defendant has been
convicted of a crime of homicide, murder, and while waiting trial on that
charge commits another serious crime that also involved violence. It also,
it will observe from the report that [defendant] appears to be in denial of
this notwithstanding his plea of guilty. Therefore, [it] raises a question in
the Court's mind about how conducive he would be to supervision in a
less restrictive setting.
Sentencing Hearing Transcript, p. 11-12 (R.93:ll-12).

n

Defendant also asserts in his brief that he has no prior record of violent crimes
(aside, presumably, from his murder conviction). Brief of Appellant, p. 11. However,
defendant does not cite to the record on appeal in support of this assertion, and there is
thus no way to evaluate the nature of defendant's past criminal record. As noted
above, the nature of defendant's background as described in the presentence report is
not subject to review in the absence of a proper record. Further, consecutive
sentencing may be appropriate even where the defendant had no prior violent crimes on
his record. State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997) (consecutive
sentences appropriate for defendant without violent criminal history; defendant was
unable to show that court did not consider this factor in sentencing).
Effect of defendant's Alford plea. Defendant makes no argument that would
diminish the seriousness of his crimes, instead claiming that the court improperly failed
12
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to consider the fact that defendant still claims to be innocent. "The Court failed to take
into account that the plea of guilty was in the nature of an Alford plea . . . . At no time
did the Appellant admit there was a factual basis for his plea." Brief of Appellant, p.
8. An Alford plea is taken when a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea even though
the defendant refuses to make an admission of guilt:
While typically guilty pleas "consist of both a waiver of trial and an
express admission of guilt," Alford pleas are ones in which a defendant
"voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consents to the imposition
of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime."
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d at 672 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 37).
Defendant complains that the court failed to acknowledge the significance of his
Alford plea, as if this were a factor to be considered in his favor. Brief of Appellant, p.
8-9. To the contrary, the trial court properly found that defendant's refusal to
acknowledge his guilt shows a lower likelihood of rehabilitation and a need for a more
restrictive sentence. Compare State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (the fact
that defendant confessed "and admitted responsibility for the crimes he committed"
reflected positively on his character and weighed against consecutive sentencing).
In sum, under these facts, the trial court's decision to run defendant's sentences
consecutively was not an abuse of discretion. The court considered all of the relevant
factors in imposing the consecutive sentence and defendant has failed to show that no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See Schweitzer, 943
13
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P.2d at 652-53 ("because the length and consecutive nature of the terms are within the
statutory parameters, we cannot say that defendant's consecutive prison and jail terms
are either unfair or unnecessarily harsh"). Ultimately, since the presentence report has
not been included in the record on appeal, there is no basis for this court to consider
whether the trial court reasonably balanced the factors it considered in sentencing
defendant. Eloge, 762 P.2d at 2.
Case law. Defendant cites to two cases where appellate courts have reversed a
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences: State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah
1995), and State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). The rulings in both of these
cases were based upon an issue which is not raised in this case: extremely long
consecutive sentences that essentially removed all discretion from the Board of
Pardons.
In Smith, the sentencing court stacked four 15-year minimum mandatory terms,
resulting in a sixty-year sentence without possibility of parole. Smith, 909 P.2d at 244.
In a ruling "limited to the facts of this case," the Utah Supreme Court held "it
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to have imposed essentially a minimum
mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the Board of Pardons of discretion to take
into account defendant's future conduct and possible progress toward rehabilitation."
Id. at245.

14
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In Strunk, a 16-year-old defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, child
kidnaping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1299. He
received a life sentence on the first degree murder, and consecutive minimum
mandatory sentences of 15 years for the child kidnaping and nine years for the
aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 1299, 1301. The court remanded the case
because "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider
defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior
violent crimes." Id. at 1302.
The court went on to address Strunk's sentence. "By ordering Strunk's
minimum sentences . . . to run consecutive to each other, the trial court assured that
Strunk would spend a minimum of twenty-four years in prison before being eligible for
parole." Id. at 1301. The Court noted, "While imprisonment for that period of time,
or even longer, may prove to be necessary and appropriate, the twenty-four-year term
robs the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole Strunk sooner." Id.
Accordingly, the court directed that "if on remand the trial court again imposes the
longest minimum mandatory terms for these two offenses, all three terms should be
ordered to run concurrently to afford the Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust
Strunk's prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and preparation to return to
society." Id. at 1302.

15
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Strunk and Smith are best understood as departures from the general rule that
consecutive sentences are within the trial court's discretion, and were based on a
finding that the trial court acted to prevent the Board of Pardons from exercising any
discretion over the term of the sentence in light of defendant's later progress. In this
case, the imposition of consecutive sentences does not significantly alter the Board of
Pardon's ability to monitor defendant's rehabilitation and adjust his sentence

r

accordingly. Defendant's sentence for murder is for 5 years to life (R.93:2).
Defendant's sentence for solicitation to commit murder is for 1-15 years (R.93:12). .Z.
The Boards of Pardons therefore retains wide discretion to release defendant from
prison only one year later than they would if the sentences were ordered to run
consecutively. Indeed, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-9(l)(b) (Supp. 1998), the Board
may release defendant even before the minimum term has been served if mitigating
circumstances justify the release. Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 808
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (The Board of Pardons has the "unfettered discretion" to
release defendant after any minimum period of the indeterminate sentence); see also
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 652 (Strunk and Smith rulings were based upon infringement of
the Board of Pardons' duty to monitor defendant's progress).
Accordingly, the concerns underlying the decisions in Strunk and Smith are not
present in this case, and the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
consecutive sentences. See Smith, 909 P.2d at 245 ("We do not mean to imply by this
16
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ruling that consecutive sentences are never appropriate."); State v. J olivet, 111 P. 2d
843, 844 (Utah 1986) ("Having determined that the consecutive sentences are
statutorily permissible, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in their
imposition in this case.").
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm defendant's
consecutive sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ $ _ day of December, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SCOTT KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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1

March 25, 1999

2

HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT: State versus Enrique Coria. Mr.

5

Perkins, I am in receipt of your letter as well as your

6

critique of the pre-sentence report so I understand —\

7

MR. PERKINS:

This is what I prepared and

8

(inaudible) attached to this one so that's why I did that.

9

I didn't get the pre-sentence report until yesterday when

10

I, cause I didn't want to come again if it wasn't ready so

11

I called over and spoke to your clerk and she indicated

12

that they had one.

13

immediately included the same things that I had included in

14

Judge Dutson's Court.

So, I came over and got a copy.

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. BEATON:

17

Then I

Okay.
The State didn't get a copy of

whatever you're referring to.

18

THE COURT:

Well, it's a response to the

19

presentence of this issue. And you did not get a copy of

20

that?

21
22
23
24
25

MR. PERKINS:

It's the same one that you've got

from Judge Dutson's Court.
MS. BEATON:

I don't recall getting one in Judge

Dutson's Court. What's the objection to it.
MR. PERKINS: No, no.

It was the response to the
1
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presentence investigation and it had all the letters with
it.

Were you, you were there in sentencing, weren't you?
MS. BEATON:

Yeah, I had a look at that.

Yeah, I

have.
MR. PERKINS:

I was going to say, you've had that

for months.
THE COURT:

Do you have any other brief statement

you'd make before sentencing?
MR. PERKINS:

Your Honor, I would.

My brief

statement would go to the fact that in this particular
instance Mr. Coria was awaiting getting the finalization
for bail when this instant was alleged to occur.

The Court

will recall after he was convicted of homicide we came
here, we plead no contest under an Alford plea because of
the fact that he'd already been convicted of murder of
second degree, a second degree murder, first degree felony
and was facing five to life so, I think that's somewhat
laid out in my letter but I wanted to remind the Court
because part of the response from the probation officer in
Salt Lake that went and did this report, Mr. Coria
indicates to me he talked to that individual for maybe five
minutes when he came and saw him down in prison.

So, he

really didn't have much time to see Mr. Coria and get a
feel for him.

Nor do I think that they had any of the

other information that I had furnished and had been
2
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1

furnished for the presentence report that was initially

2

prepared here in Ogden which included the psychological

3

evaluations done by Dr. Berger, Dr. Berger and the

4

sociology, the sociological report done by Mr. Beesley in

5

this regard.

6

The other thing that the Court should be aware i

7

that when Mr. Coria was charged with this a day after the

8

preliminary hearing he was then taken into custody when he

9

was out on bail.

So he's served about nine or ten months

10

in jail because this charge making him felony on a felony

11

because he already posted bail relative to the homicide.

12

My view in this particular case is because when

13

you're talking about the only testimony was from the

14

individual John Gerrard at the preliminary hearing, his

15

testimony was the first time he ever meets Mr. Coria and

16

Mr. Coria is soliciting him to, you know, commit this

17

homicide. Mr. Gerrard didn't know that James Carrol was

18

his best friend and has been his best friend for two or

19

three years prior to this time, that they hung out

20

together. Always hung out together.

21

Obviously had he known that he might not have made those

22

statements.

23

still remains an issue in my estimation and mind. Mr.

24

Coria is sentenced and is serving a five to life at the

25

present time for the homicide.

He didn't know that.

The credibility was certainly at issue and it

He indicated to me today
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that he's already involved in some programs at the prison.
He's already involved in, it's called Conquest. And in
that they have different areas and fields in which he'll be
involved in including drug awareness, alcohol counseling,
group setting, group therapy, orientation awareness, anger
management, and he's not sure of all the areas in which
he'll be in.

Obviously this wasn't even known to the

people preparing the presentence report so they're not,
they're certainly not getting a very complete story as to
what Mr. Coria is like.
I make all of these representations to the Court
because my view is that the sentence shouldn't even be
concurrent or consecutive. My view is the fact that the
way this case was postured Mr. Coria should be given credit
for time served and this case ought to be terminated
because he served about nine months for this particular
offense because he wasn't entitled to bail at that point in
time.

So, in essence, it was for this particular offense.

So, obviously, we think that that's more than enough for
what the allegations were. And it's important to note that
Mr. Coria never, ever did anything to follow up on. Matter
of fact, what he did was he kind of told Gerrard the first
time he called him after he was out, he ignores him,
doesn't respond the second time he calls. He said, I've
already taken care of it.

Obviously, he wasn't meaning
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4

that he'd done anything because Mr. Gerrard, nothing was
ever done or attempted, excuse me, with Mr. Carroll, his
friend.

So, I think the nine months that he served is

sufficient.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Do you wish to say

anything, Mr. Coria?
MR. CORIA: No.
MS. BEATON:

The State does.

THE COURT:

You may be heard.

MS. BEATON:

Thank you.

You Honor, this feeling

of Mr. Palmrey and I, who prosecuted both the murder and
were assigned to this particular case, that the sentencing
recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole is
appropriate in this case, that this crime be sentenced
consecutive to the murder case that he has.
Mr. Perkins wants to talk about John Gerrard, the
inmate who came and testified and unfortunately this Court
did not get the opportunity to hear the preliminary
hearing.

But, nonetheless, Mr. Gerrard came down here and

testified at both that preliminary hearing and at the
actual murder trial to a variety of facts that he knew that
were not public knowledge, that had not placed in the
newspaper, or any other way that he could have found that
information out but for the fact that he was talking to the
defendant. And in addition to the defendant telling him a
5
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1 I great many details about the crime that he had committed,
2 | he also indicates to him at that time that he would give
3 I him $1,000 if he were willing to kill the other individual
4

who was in the truck.

5

Now, at some point in time Mr. Coria knew.

This

6

is a situation where this case goes unsolved essentially

7

for almost a month's period of time because there were no

8

witnesses. We have a group of individuals that come from

9

Logan to the Weber County area and they've never seen the

10

defendant, they don't know him personally or anything like

11

that. And they end up getting shot at repeatedly by the

12

defendant and then Mr. Carrol is riding along with the

13

defendant.

14

essentially based on the fact that he confesses and that

15

Mr. Carrol is also in the car and he has also given a

16

statement to Detective Ledford of the gang unit.

So, the defendant knows that this case is

17

So, the defendant in his own mind and according

18

to John Gerrard told Detective Ledford that the defendant

19

sees C.J. Carroll, the witness in this case, and the guy

20

that's in the car with him, despite the fact that he's a

21

friend of his, as an essential witness for the State and an

22

essential witness in order to see that he's convicted on

23

the murder case. Also, the defendant makes comments to

24

John Gerrard, things about ballistics and how he didn't

25

think that we would be able the ballistics that are found
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1

in the victims head as compared to the gun that was

2

recovered that the defendant had the night that he was

3

arrested and those sorts of things.

4

even more of a necessary witness in the State's case.

5

Thereby making him

There was also some indication, after speaking

6

with Mr. Carroll, the witness in the case, that the

7

defendant may, in fact, have been upset because he was also

8

not charged in this crime.

9

apparently where the defendant, after he was bailed out,

There was an incident

10

went over to Mr. Carroll's home and was mad and engaged in

11

some sort of angry display there, ripping up pictures and

12

that sort of thing.

13

charged.

14

the car and two different guns were fired on that night.

15

Now, the defendant admitted that at one point, he's

16

questioned first and he admits to using both of the guns at

17

some point in that night.

18

Was angry because he also wasn't

And, in fact, there were two different guns in

Mr. Carroll indicates he never was involved in

19

any of the guns, although from what it was looking like in

20

the defendant's reaction it may have been possible that Mr.

21

Carroll may have been using one of the two guns, as well.

22

But we do think the gun that shot the victim was the one

23

that the defendant used because that's what the defendant

24

told us.

25

Also, in addition to Mr. Gerrard, if we're to
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

comment, obviously we're not here for trial but if we're

2

going to comment on Mr, Gerrard as a witness just in

3

general because I do agree with Mr. Perkins assessment.

4

This was a case where an inmate contacts Detective Ledford.

5

He, in fact, contacts his attorney, Mr. Miles, who then in

6

turn contacts Mr. Saunders from our office, who, then in

7

turn, we then make arrangements for him to go talk to

8

Detective Ledford.

9

is doing this as some risk to himself.

But Mr. Gerrard, when he's doing this,
I mean he was

10

obviously concerned both of the two times that he testified

11

because he's in the Utah State prison himself and he knew

12

he was going to go to the Utah State prison.

13

risking his life essentially by coming and testifying on

14

two occasions.

15

not given any kind of concession on the charges he

16

currently had pending while he was in the Weber County jail

17

from the State of Utah in exchange for his testimony

18

against this defendant and he has not since been given any

19

sort of consideration for it and never, in fact, asked for

20

any consideration for it.

21

So, he's

There was nothing in it for him.

He was

Spoke with Detective Ledford on at least two or

22

three different occasions. Actually was willing to

23

participate in a monitored call in which he did speak with

24

the defendant on two different occasions and did all of

25

this without requesting anything in exchange from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

State. No leniency on his charges, no intervention at the

2

Board of Pardons or anything for himself. And essentially

3

the reason he said that he came forward was because this

4

guy is talking about killing another person while he's

5

sitting in the Weber County jail awaiting trial on a murder

6

case.

7

Now, as far as the time that he has served while

8

he was in and he did get, he actually did bail out at one

9

point in time on a property bond.

He then did come back in

10

on felony, on felony status.

11

status which made non-bailable at that point in time but

12

the State is prepared to concede that he should be

13

receiving credit for time served, I believe he'd received

14

credit for time served in the murder case though and it

15

doesn't seem necessary that he receive credit for time

16

served on each of the two crimes.

17

It was the felony on felony

In addition, your Honor, this is a situation

18

where somebody is awaiting trial on a murder case and in

19

order for the State to put forth cases in this county and

20

in this State, it is necessary that we have witnesses who

21

are available to testify. And essentially what the

22

defendant was willing to do was to snub out an essential

23

witness or a witness that we thought would be essential

24

originally when the case was filed, to snub that witness

25

out prior to actually going to trial so he could somehow
9
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1

prevent us from actually going to trial and putting this

2

case to the Court.

3

The State's position is is that the Defendant

4

did, one, and has been convicted of the murder charge, and,

5

two, has now admitted to this solicitation type charge.

6

Both of these incidents are very serious and both of these

7

deserve that the defendant receive an appropriate

8

punishment. And essentially, also, to send a message to

9

other inmates who are sitting in the Weber County Jail that

10

this county will not tolerate somebody making arrangements

11

to kill a witness in a case.

12

that his sentence should be consecutive to the murder case.

13

MR. PERKINS:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. PERKINS:

It is the State's position

Your Honor, if I may respond.

Briefly.
Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor,

16

I think that it's obviously a situation for a concurrent.

17

We're talking about, the only reason it's presumptively

18

concurrent unless there is a showing that of non-

19

rehabilitation type of aspects and all that.

20

addressed.

21

presentence report done in Judge Dutson's Court nor in this

22

second report.

23

knew it was going to be like that we could have done it

24

three months ago as far as the information that it

25

supplied.

Those aren't

Those weren't addressed, either in the

This second report, I don't know, if we

10
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Obviously, Ms. Beaton and I have a much different
view as far as Mr. Gerrard is concerned, what he said and
how it (inaudible).

But the point is, the State charged

this as a soliciting, not as a conspiracy because they
never had any overt acts and they knew they couldn't ever
establish any overt acts.

They're talking about this one

jailhouse confession at best as being the foundation for
this charge which obviously people in jail say all kinds of
things.
Mr. Coria, as I indicated in my response to the
Court, Gerrard brings up the subject and Mr. Coria just
says that's what he did.
and he still doesn't.
it.

I never wanted to kill my friend

Never has. Never did anything to do

So, that's our position, your Honor.

for sentencing.

We are prepared

I would indicate that relative to the

other charge he does have a prison assessment already
that's given of 18 years so that's where that stand
relative to active prison at this particular time.
THE COURT:

The Court will make this observation

that he did plead guilty to a criminal solicitation.

The

Court will make the following findings that this defendant
has been convicted of a crime of homicide, murder, and
while waiting trial on that charge commits another serious
crime that also involved violence.

It also, it will

observe from the report that appears to be in denial of
11
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this notwithstanding his plea of guilty.

Therefore, raises

a question in the Court's mind about how conducive he would
be to supervision in a less restrictive setting.

The Court

further finds that subsequent to his arrest he then commits
another serious grave crime.
The pre-sentence report does not address any
mitigating circumstances but the Court will make this
finding based on Dr. Beasley's report that was submitted to
the Court that he does appear to the Court to be somewhat
developmentally slow, perhaps has the equivalent mental
development of a twelve to fourteen year old and sometimes
does not see the, accurately some of the consequences of
his acts.
This Court has balanced all of these
considerations and since, also what Ms. Beaton has observed
that the solicitation to kill a person who may be a witness
in a homicide seems to the Court to be a very serious
charge-and it's one to which he plead guilty.

Having

regard, therefore, for his potential to be rehabilitated,
having regard for the severity of all of these aggravating
circumstances, the Court sentences the defendant to serve a
prison term of one to fifteen years and I will order that
that be served consecutively.

It strikes the Court that

given the nature of this offense that does not prove to the
Court to be oppressive or unreasonable. And I'm doing that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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also mindful that he's already down there five years to
life but my guess is that they could keep him as long as
they wanted to but they will also take a look at this
sentence and recognize that in the Court's judgment, and
they look to what the trial judge is recommending, this
Court is concerned about this conduct and this case on the
heels of a very serious crime.
You have thirty days in which to file an appeal
of this size.
MR. PERKINS:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon the sentencing was concluded.
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